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By letter of 29 September 1989 the Committee on Institutional Affairs 
requested authorization to draw up a report on the intergovernmental 
conference in the context of Parliament's strategy for European Union. 
At the sitting of 20 November 1989 the President of the European Parliament 
announced that the Committee had been authorized to report on this subject. 
At its meeting of 31 October 1989 the Committee on Institutional Affairs 
appointed Mr D. Martin rapporteur. 
On 14 March 1990 the European Parliament adopted the resolution contained in 
the first interim report by the rapporteur (Doe. A3-47/90). On 11 July 1990 
the European Parliament adopted the resolution contained in the second interim 
report by the rapporteur (Doe. A3-166/90). On 22 November 1990 the European 
Parliament adopted the resolution contained in the third interim report by the 
rapporteur (Doe. A3-270/90). 
At its meeting of 28 January 1992 the Enlarged Bureau decided to ask all the 
other committees that wished to deliver an opinion to do so. 
At its meeting of 29/30 January 1992 the committee decided, following a 
proposal by the President of the European Parliament on 28 January 1992, to 
incorporate the conclusions contained in the opinion of the Committee on 
Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy into its resolution in 
view of the special responsibility of that committee and its rapporteur, 
Mr Herman, for the intergovernmental conference on Economic and Monetary 
Union. 
At its meetings of 17/18 December 1991, 22/23 and 28/29 January, 18/19 and 
26/27 February and 17/18 and 24/25 March 1992 the Committee on Institutional 
Affairs considered the draft report. 
At the last meeting it adopted the motion for a resolution by 23 votes to 4 
with 2 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: OREJA, chairman; PRAG and BRU PURON, 
vice-chairmen; D. MARTIN, rapporteur; AGLIETTA, BEIROCO, BOCKLET (for LUSTER), 
BOISSIERE, CASSANMAGNAGO CERRETTI, CHEYSSON, DE GIOVANNI, DE GUCHT, DURY (for 
GLINNE), DUVERGER, FERRER (for BOURLANGES), HANSCH, HERMAN, LAGAKOS, MARINHO, 
METTEN, MUSSO, PEREZ ROYO, PLANAS PUCHADES, ROUMELIOTIS, SCHODRUCH (for BLOT), 
TURNER (for SPENCER), VALVERDE LOPEZ, WOLTJER (for FORD) and VON WECHMAR. 
The report was tabled on 26 March 1992. 
The deadline for tabling amendments wi 11 appear on the draft agenda for the 
part-session at which the report is to be considered. 
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A. 
MOTION FOR RESOLUTION 
on the results of the intergovernmental conferences 
The European Parliament: 
having regard to the Treaty on European Union signed in Maastricht on 7 
February 1992, 
having regard to the European Parliament's proposals submitted to the 
IGCs, 1 
having regard to the Declaration adopted by the Conference of the 
Parliaments of the Member States of the European Community in Rome in 
November 1990 and submitted to the IGCs, 
having regard to the proposal from President Mi tterrand and Chancellor 
Kohl to establish European Union, 
having regard to the report of its Committee on Institutional Affairs and 
the opinions of the Committees on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
Industrial Policy as well as all its other standing committees 
(Doe. A3-0123/92), 
A. whereas the European Parliament defined the essential elements of European 
Union as being: 
1 
11 economic and monetary union with a single currency and an 
autonomous central bank; 
a common foreign policy, including joint consideration of the 
issues of peace, security and arms control; 
a completed single market with common policies in all the areas 
in wh i eh the economic integration and mutua 1 interdependence of 
the Member States require common action notably to ensure 
economic and social cohesion and a balanced environment; 
elements of common citizenship and a common framework for 
protecting basic rights; 
an institutional system which is sufficiently efficient to manage 
these responsibilities effectively and which is democratically 
structured, notably by giving the European Parliament a right of 
initiative, of eo-decision with the Council on Community 
legislation, the right to ratify all constitutional decisions 
Notably EP Resolutions of 11 July 1990 (OJ C231, P.97), 22 
November 1990 (OJ C324, p. 219) (MARTIN Reports); 16 May 1990 (OJ 
C149 p.66) and 10 October 1990 (OJ C284 p.62) (HERMAN Reports) 
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requiring the ratification of the Member States also and the 
right to elect the President of the Commission;" 2 
B. whereas the Treaty of Maastricht contains provisions which are inconsistent 
with regard to the above requirements and whereas a 1 though some progress 
has been achieved on EMU, common policies and citizenship, the 
institutional system contains shortcomings to the extent that it is 
doubtful whether the European Union will be able to achieve its proclaimed 
objectives, especially if its membership is enlarged, and whereas it has 
not eliminated the parliamentary democratic deficit; 
C. whereas the IGCs themselves recognised the insufficiency of their 
achievements in that they provided in the Treaty for a new IGC in 1996. 
D. whereas, at the intergovernmental conference, a temporary mandate was given 
for further improvements to be made by the end of 1992 and a decision was 
taken to create a cohesion fund. 
In general 
1. Considers that the urgent need for a formal act embodying the desire for 
union of the Member States of the Community and the reactions so far in 
several Member States require immediate ratification of the Treaty of 
Maastri cht, despite its shortcomings, but considers that the EP and the 
national parliaments must seize the opportunity of ratification to demand 
significant progress towards a genuine European union and to put forward 
spec·ific proposals as outlined in this resolution and in accordance with 
the final declaration of the Conference of Parliaments of the European 
Community; 
2. Draws attention to the following major shortcomings in the new treaty 
which: 
a) Is based on a "pillar" structure that: 
2 
3 
leaves the common foreign and security policy outside the 
Community Treaty (with, therefore, a lesser role for the 
Commission and for Parliament and no possibility for legal 
redress at the Court of Justice) and wi 11 confuse the rest of 
the world with the "Union" (represented by the Presidency of 
Council) acting in some areas and the "Community" (represented by 
the Commission) acting in others; 
leaves cooperation in the spheres of justice and home affairs 
outside the Community treaty thus escaping effective 
parliamentary and judicial control in an area in which citizens' 
rights are directly affected3 ; 
EP Resolution of 11th July 1990, OJ C231, p.97, para. 3 
however, this "pi 11 ar" cannot remove from the Community the 
competences that it already has in this field, notably those accepted 
in the White Paper on completing the internal market (paragraphs 24-31 
and paragraphs 47-56) and those provided for in the EEC treaty 
(Articles 100a and 235) 
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provides for defence matters to be delegated to WEU without 
providing for appropriate parliamentary control of the activities 
of this organization. 
b) Fails to provide any economic policy authority with adequate 
democratic legitimacy to counterbalance the autonomous monetary policy 
authority of the European Central Bank and lays down specific 
procedures for economic policy decisions which derogate in Council's 
favour from traditional Community procedures. 
c) Does not provide a real eo-decision procedure, which would have meant 
that the EP and the Council would have had the same d~cision-making 
powers over any 1 egi s 1 at i ve act, si nee the Counc i 1 is a 11 owed to act 
unilaterally in the absence of an agreement with the EP, and also 
applies this procedure only to a limited area. 
d) Fails to provide for parliamentary assent for future treaty changes, 
for the modification of own resources or for additional measures 
concerning citizenship. 
e) Retains procedures requ1nng unanimity in Council for a very wide 
range of decision-taking and legislative procedures, including, 
remarkably, two areas in which the procedure of Article 189b applies, 
and areas of vital interest to the Community such as many aspects of 
social and environmental policy and taxation. 
f) Contains altogether such a variety of legislative procedures, mostly 
with variants, that overall transparency and clarity is lacking, and 
making conflicts over legal bases inevitable. 
g) Provides for only a limited increase in the scope of Community action 
in the field of social policy, even among the eleven Member States 
committed to making progress in this field, particularly where issues 
to do with social security and the nationals of third countries are 
concerned, these matters still being subject to a unanimous vote by 
the Council. 
h) Does not stipulate that members of the Committee of the Regions must 
be democratically elected representatives of regional or local 
bodies. 
i ) Introduces a provision 
international agreements 
previously given their 
Parliament's approval. 
allowing 
to which 
assent, 
Council unilaterally to repeal 
both Parliament and Council had 
and to adopt sanctions without 
j) Contains in the Protocols, annexed to the Treaty, prov1s1ons that will 
derogate from the principle of equal treatment laid down in Article 
119 of the EEC Treaty. 
k) Fails sufficiently to develop 
protection for fundament a 1 rights 
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fails to institute a charter of fundamental rights and freedoms on the 
basis of Parliament's resolution of 12 April 19894 • 
1) Fails to address the issue of the classification and hierarchy of 
Community acts, thus maintaining the lack of distinction between 
legislative and executive acts, or the related issue of the procedures 
for delegating implementing mesures to the Commission (commitology 
procedures}, which remain unsatisfactory. 
m} In budgetary matters it formally incorporates the principle that not 
all expenditure should be included in the budget; maintains the 
imbalance in relation between the two arms of the Budgetary Authority, 
notably by granting the Parliament, with regard to own resources, no 
more than a right of consultation and by maintaining the obsolete 
distinction between compulsory and non-compulsory expenditure; fails 
to incorporate any of the procedural advances which have been made in 
recent years. 
n} Fails to merge the EAEC and ECSC treaties with the EEC Treaty or even 
to adjust their 1 egi slat i ve procedures in order to bring them into 
line with the EEC Treaty. 
o} Fai 1 s to adjust the number of members of the European Parliament to 
take account of German unity. 
p} Fails to lay down specific provisions concerning energy, civil 
protection and tourism, although these are now added to the list of 
Community activities specified in Article 3 of the EEC Treaty. 
q} Fails to modify the procedures for appointing members of the Court of 
Justice and the Court of Auditors in order to involve confirmation by 
the European Parliament and enhance their independence. 
r) Fails to recognize Parliament as having equivalent rights to initiate 
and participate in proceedings before the Court of Justice as the 
other political institutions and the Member States of the Community. 
s) Ought to have stated that the Council, when enacting legislation, will 
meet publicly; 
3. Recognizes, nevertheless, the pos~tive elements included in the new Treaty, 
all of which were requested before the IGCs by the EP, notably: 
a) The commitment to establish economic and monetary union with a single 
currency and central bank. 
b) The wider scope of Community competences with the addition of new 
titles and articles to the EEC Treaty concerning, notably, consumer 
protection, public health, culture, education, industry, development 
and trans-European networks. 
c) The inclusion in the Treaty of the principle of subsidiarity in 
defence of national and, especially, regional powers. 
4 OJ C 120, 16.5.1989, p. 51 
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d) 
e) 
The commitment to a common foreign and security policy though 
Parliament regrets that 
Community system and 
political initiative 
policy. 
The enhanceJ commitment 
cohesion, ecologically 
employment. 
this is not covered by the institutional 
therefore by Parliament's supervision and 
including, eventually, a common defence 
to the principles 
sustainable growth, 
of economic 
and a high 
and social 
1 evel of 
f) The enlargement, albeit small, of the domain of qualified majority 
voting. 
g) The new procedure for the appointment of the Commission which 
involves the European Parliament and which links the term of office of 
the Commission to that of Parliament. 
h) The extension of the legislative powers of the European Parliament in 
certain areas. 
i} The extension or confirmation of certain powers of control of the 
European Parliament and certain obligations of the Commission 
regarding the implementation of the budget, the establishment of 
committees of inquiry, the right of petitions, the recognition of 
sound financial management as a formal criterion for budgetary 
control . 
j} The recognition of a right of initiative for the European Parliament, 
albeit limited. 
k} The citizenship 
rights in the 
elections. 
provisions, in particular those providing for voting 
Member State of residence for European and local 
l) The obligation on the Member States to prosecute infringements of the 
Community's financial interests and to coordinate their activities, 
and the consequent need to promulgate an EC-wide judicial basis to 
harmonize national judicial systems in this area. 
m) The granting to the Court of Justice of the right to impose penalties 
on Member States failing to comply with its judgements. 
n} The creation of a consultative Committee of the Regions. 
o) Provisions encouraging cooperation between nation a 1 
the European Parliament without creating 
institutions. 
parliaments and 
new superfluous 
4. Also welcomes other elements introduced into the Treaty, including the 
appointment by the European Parliament of a European Ombudsman and 
consular protection for Community citizens in third countries. 
5. Regrets the attitude of the current British government that led to special 
prov1s1ons for the UK regarding monetary union and social policy; 
welcomes, however, the fact that the other Member States were not willing 
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to be blocked by the negative attitude of a single national government; 
expects that the opt-out cl a use regarding EMU will , in practice, never be 
used and considers that the derogation from parts of social policy is not 
sustainable and should be rectified as soon as possible. 
As regards economic and monetary union 
6. Welcomes the historic decision taken by the Maastricht European Council to 
introduce a single currency by 1999 at the latest and by 1997 at the 
earliest, a decision which implies the conduct of a uniform monetary policy 
and the establishment of an independent European System of Central Banks, 
but regrets that the transitional period should be so long, and urges the 
governments to coordinate their budgetary policy efforts to the utmost, 
with a view to minimizing the adverse effects and instability inherent in a 
lengthy transitional period, since the implementation of the convergence 
programmes will have an undesirable economic and social impact, in 
particular in certain Member States. 
7. Deplores the marked similarity between the management structure chosen for 
the European Monetary Institute and that of the Committee of Governors and 
the EMCF; this is not sufficient to ensure the independence of the EMI vis-
a-vis the current central banks and vis-a-vis national governments. 
8. Deplores the fact that, if economic policy-making is to be effective, the 
scope for parliamentary influence will suffer at national and European 
level, since national parliaments will lose their ability to discipline 
national governme~ts because the Council will act by a qualified majority, 
while the European Parliament will only be notified after the event; is 
shocked by the provision that recommendations to individual Member States 
will normally not be disclosed, even to the parliament of the Member State 
concerned. 
9. Regrets that EMU appears to be exclusively geared to stability; while 
acknowledging the importance of stability, calls for deflationary effects 
to be prevented when Member States not yet meeting the strict convergence 
criteria gear their policy to those criteria; calls for the objectives of 
responsible growth and a high level of employment and social protection to 
be taken equally seriously, even though there is no provision as yet in the 
Treaty for specific binding measures in this regard. 
10. Regrets that the blueprint for economic policy outlined in the Treaty makes 
redundant the democratic control exercised hitherto by the national 
parliaments; such a loss, whether direct or indirect, is evident in the 
following areas: 
(a) the economic policy guidelines tradionally established by democratic 
control of their budgets; 
(b) safeguard measures vis-a-vis third countries; 
(c) financial assistance from one Member State to another; 
(d) the right to ask their governments to make a recommendation in the 
areas referred to in Art. 109c; 
this loss has not been offset by transferring equivalent democratic control 
to the European Parliament. 
11. Calls, with a view to reducing this democratic deficit, and prior to being 
in a position to include them in the forthcoming amendments to the Treaty, 
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for an interinstitutional agreement between the Council, the Commission and 
the European Parliament on the basis of which these institutions can 
cooperate with Parliament, particularly in the areas mentioned in the last 
paragraph and in the following areas: 
(a) the penalties imposed by the Council on a Member State which fails to 
comply with a decision concerning the reduction of an excessive 
deficit; 
(b) international agreements concerning monetary or foreign exchange 
regime matters; 
(c) the appointment of the chairman, the vice-chairman and the other 
members of the Executive Board of the European Central 
(d) the Council directives or decisions laying down 
conditions for mutual assistance for a Member State 
balance of payments difficulties; 
Bank; 
the terms and 
threatened with 
(e) the abrogation of a derogation granted to a Member State concerning 
the introduction of the ECU as the single currency; 
(f) the assessment of convergence programmes. 
12. Deplores the fact that the Maastricht European Council made no provision 
for the decisions concerning tax harmonization to be taken by a majority in 
the Council in cooperation with Parliament. It considers it strange that 
Art. 115 was revised rather than simply deleted. It also regrets that the 
contribution of the new cohesion fund to financing trans-European networks 
has been limited under Art. 130d of the Treaty to transport infrastructures 
instead of being extended to cover tel ecommuni cations and energy 
infrastructures. 
13. Welcomes the inclusion of Title XIII on industry, but considers that the 
only way to compensate for the weakness of European industry would be to 
endow the Community with powers and financial resources equal to the task 
of overcoming the handicaps in order to face up to the intensification of 
international competition. It also regrets that the decisions to be taken 
by the Council on the basis of these articles remain subject to the 
unanimity rule, and that Parliament's role is confined to delivering a non-
binding opinion. 
Conclusions 
14. Expresses its determination, as with the Single European Act 5 to: 
exploit to the very limit the possibilities offered by the Treaty of 
Maastricht; 
to pursue its endeavours to obtain a democratic and effective 
European Union of federal type. 
15. In this light: 
a) Invites the national parliaments, when ratifying the Treaty to call on 
their respective governments: 
to prepare the next IGC in order to eliminate the shortcomings of 
the Treaty of Maastricht in particular as regards the remaining 
5 Resolution of 16 January 1986 
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democratic deficit and the efficiency of the decision making 
process; 
to invite their respective governments to undertake not to make 
use in Council of the provisions of paragraph 6 of Art. 189b 
which allows Council to act unilaterally in the event of 
conciliation failing to reach agreement, and not to adopt in 
Council any legislative act which Parliament has earlier rejected 
by absolute majority. 
b) Invites the Council and the Commission, as in the past, to enter into 
i nteri nst i tut ion a l agreements with the Parliament to ensure that new 
treaties are applied in the most constructive and democratic way 
possible. 
c) Invites the Commission, wherever legally possible, to choose for its 
proposals legal bases that require the eo-decision procedure and 
expects the Commission to withdraw its proposals where, under that 
procedure, Council and Parliament fail to reach agreement in the 
conciliation committee or where, under the consultation and 
cooperation procedures, Parliament rejects a text. 
d) Invites the Council to make use of the "passerelle" provided for in 
Art. K9 to the Treaty of Maastri cht and thereby transfer matters 
concerning justice and home affairs to the field of competence of the 
European Community. 
e) Instructs the responsible parliamentary organs to prepare a reform of 
Parliament's working methods that will enable it to make full use of 
the new procedures and to take the necessary measures within their 
field of responsibility, bearing in mind the obligation imposed by 
Art. F (3) of the Maastricht Treaty for the Union to "provide itself 
with the means necessary to attain its objectives and carry through 
its policies". 
f) Undertakes to begin already preparations for a new rev1s1on of the 
treaties which should aim to eliminate the shortcomings of the Treaty 
of Maastricht; believes that many of the issues must be addressed 
before the IGC scheduled in 1996, in particular because treaty 
amendments are necessary: 
to adjust the number of members of the European Parliament for 
German unity; 
to allow the accession 
significant improvement 
as regards Parliament's 
of Council; 
of new Member States which requires a 
in decision-taking procedures, notably 
right of eo-decision and the functioning 
to remedy the democratic deficit. 
g) Stresses that it will not agree to the accession of new members unless 
the democratic deficit is eliminated. 
h) Instructs its responsible committee to continue its preparation of a 
draft constitution (COLOMBO Report) through procedures involving the 
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national parliaments as provided for in the Declaration of the 
conference of the parliaments of the European Community of November 
1990 in Rome {"assizes") in order to consolidate the achievements of 
Maastricht and the further changes required into a coherent, balanced 
and democratic and efficient institutional system. 
16. Instructs its President to forward this resolution and the report of the 
Committee on Institutional Affairs to the Commission, the Council, the 
Court of Justice, the Court of First Instance, the Court of Auditors, the 
Economic and Social Committee, the governments and parliaments of the 
Member States. 
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B. 
E X P L A N A T 0 R V S T A T E M E N T 
No-one can be fully satisfied with the results of the Maastricht Summit. Any 
negotiation involving a compromise with at least one Government that was 
phi 1 osoph i ea 11 y opposed to the who 1 e ex ere i se was un 1 i ke 1 y to go far beyond 
the lowest common denominator. That it did so in some respects is thanks to 
the pressure brought to bear by the supporters of a federal Union, both within 
the Commmunity institutions (notably the European Parliament) and outside. 
In defining what it envisaged for the Union, the European Parliament defined 
their essential items to be: 1 
economic and monetary union with a single currency and an autonomous 
central bank; 
a common foreign policy, including joint consideration of the issues of 
peace, security and arms control; 
a completed single market with common policies in all the areas in which 
the economic integration and mutua 1 interdependence of the Member States 
require common action, notably to ensure economic and social cohesion and a 
balanced environment; 
elements of common citizenship and a common framework for protecting basic 
rights; 
an institutional system which is sufficiently efficient to manage these 
responsibilities effectively and which is democratically structured, 
notably by giving the European Parliament a right of initiative, of eo-
decision with the Council on Community legislation, the right to ratify 
all constitutional decisions requ1r1ng the ratification of the Member 
States also and the right to elect the President of the Commission;" 
If we look at the results of Maastricht in light of the above definition, we 
can see that it does indeed contain provisions for attaining economic and 
monetary union with a single currency under an autonomous centra 1 bank; for 
establishing a foreign policy that would also deal with the issues of peace, 
security and arms control; for complementing the single market with policies 
for economic and social cohesion, a balance environment etc and for a 
definition of some elements of common citizenship. 
Progress is i nsuffi ci ent, however, as regards the 1 ast indent of the above 
definition, namely an effective and democratic institutional system. As it 
stands, the institutional structure of the Union may well prove too weak to be 
able to manage the policies attributed to it. 
1 Resolution of the European Parliament on the Intergovernmental Conferences 
in the context of Parliament's structure for European Union (Martin 11), OJ 
c 231, 17.9.1990, p. 97. 
DOC_EN\RR\205517 - 13 - PE 155.444/fin./Part I 
Let us examine the key points of the new Treaty, in each case comparing the 
outcome of the IGCs with the requests made by the European Parliament (Martin 
Reports*) and by the Conference of Parliaments ("Assizes") held in Rome in 
December 1990. 
It should be noted that this comparison is made on the basis of the texts 
issued following the Maastricht European Council meeting, prior to the final 
legally "polished" text. References to article numbers may therefore not be 
those which appear in the final Treaty. 
I. Principles and Structure of the Treaty 
The European Parliament called for a "European Union of 
II resolution, para. 4) which "must be based on a 
framework" with EPC matters "to be dealt with in the 
(Martin II, para. 8). 
federal type" (MARTIN 
single institutional 
Community framework" 
The Rome assizes wished "to remodel the Community into a European Union on a 
federal basis" (Recital C) and took the view that "European Political 
Cooperation must be incorporated into the treaty and into the Community 
structures" (paragraph 4). 
The Maastricht Treaty provides for a "pillar" structure whereby one part of 
the Treaty amends and adds to the Community treaties, but the provisions 
concerning foreign policy and security (and those concerning cooperation on 
internal affairs and justice) are not incorporated into the Community 
treaties. They stand in their own right with largely intergovernmental 
procedures not subject to judicial review in the Court of Justice. Compared 
to the current EPC system, it will at least be the Council (rather than "the 
Foreign Ministers meeting in political cooperation") which conducts the 
policy, with a degree of involvement from the other institutions: the process 
is therefore brought closer to the Community framework even if it is not yet 
fully integrated within it. The reference to the "federal destiny" of the 
Community was, in the end, not incorporated into the Treaty - (but the US 
Constitution does not contain the word federal either!). 
* There were three MARTIN reports, MARTIN I (March 1990) which laid down the 
basic approach of Parliament. MARTIN 11 (July 1990) which spelled out in 
detail Parliament's proposals to change the treaties and MARTIN Ill 
(November 1990) which put these proposals into the legal language of treaty 
articles. MARTIN 11 is the one most suitable for quotation. 
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11. Common Foreign Policy 
The European Parliament called for EPC to be dealt with in the Community 
framework (paragraph 8, MARTIN 11 resolution) for Council "to be given the 
prime responsibility for defining policy" for the Commission "to have a right 
of initiative" and "a role in representing the Community externally"; for the 
EPC secretariat "to be absorbed by the Commission and Council"; for foreign 
policy to be the subject of European Parliament "scrutiny" (paragraph 9, 
MARTIN 11 Resolution); for the scope of foreign policy to include security, 
peace and disarmament (paragraph 10) and for the Community "to have common 
policies in all matters in which the Member States share essential interests" 
(paragraph 11). Qualified majority voting would be the norm, but Member 
States could be granted derogations or, exceptionally, opt out (MARTIN III). 
The assizes considered "that a political 
security policy of matters of common interest 
must be incorporated into the Treaty and 
(paragraph 4). 
Union comprising a foreign and 
must be established and that EPC 
into the Community structures" 
The Maastricht Treaty prov1s1ons on a common foreign and security policy were 
laid down in Title V which remain separate from the Community treaties, as did 
Art. 30 of the Single European Act. However, it is to be the Counc i 1 (rather 
than "the Foreign Ministers meeting in EPC") which is to lay down policy. The 
Commission will have a right of initiative, but the Union will be represented 
externally by the President of Council. Decisions will be taken by unanimity, 
but, in cases where it is agreed to follow "joint action" Council may define 
(unanimously) those matters on which implementing decisions can then be taken 
by a qualified majority. The EPC secretariat will be absorbed by the Council 
secretariat. The CFSP includes "all questions related to the security of the 
European Union, i ne 1 ud i ng the eventua 1 framing of a common defence po 1 icy, 
which might in time lead to a common defence". However, defence matters are 
sub-contracted to WEU, whose membership will be enlarged to all those Member 
States wishing to acceed to it. WEU secretariat and council will be moved to 
Brussels and close working relationships will be established with the 
Community institutions (sychronized presidencies, contact with the Commission, 
cooperation between the EP and WEU Assembly). 
Ill. Economic & Monetary Union 
(see the opinion of the 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and Industrial Policy) 
IV. Citizens Rights 
The European Parliament called for the incorporation into the treaties of its 
Declaration of fundamental rights and freedoms and the Joint Declaration 
against racism and xenophobia. It ea ll ed for the Community to acceed to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It called for the development of 
common forms of European citizenship through "such measures as voting rights 
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for Community citizens in municipal and European elections in their Member 
State of residence" {MARTIN 11, paras. 18 & 19). 
The assizes called for "the inclusion in the treaties of provisions to 
establish the idea of European citizenship, including the right for Community 
citizens to vote in European elections in the Member State in which they 
reside" and called for the inclusion in the treaties of the EP's declaration 
on fundamental rights and EC accession to the ECHR {Rome Declaration, para. 
10). 
The Maastri cht Treaty added a new section on citizenship to the EEC Treaty. 
It opens with the statement that "citizenship of the Union is hereby 
established". Citizens of Member States are citizens of the Union, enjoying 
the rights conferred by the Treaty, including the right to move and reside 
free 1 y within the territory of the Member States, the right to vote in 1 oca 1 
and European elections and the right to enjoy consular protection abroad by 
the diplomatic authorities of other Member States where his/her own is not 
represented. These rights must, however, be exercised in accordance with 
detailed arrangements to be adopted by the end of 1994 by Council {assent of 
Parliament required regarding residence rights). Union citizens are also 
given the right to petition the Parliament or apply to a Community ombudsman 
to be elected by Parliament. An article states that European political 
parties "contribute to the forming of a European awareness and expressing the 
political will of the citizens of the Union". The new Treaty does not 
comprise a declaration of fundamental rights but the "common provisions" 
{Article F) of the Union Treaty, which are not subject to review by the Court 
of Justice, states that the Union shall respect fundamental rights as 
guaranteed by the ECHR. 
V. Subsidiarity 
The European Parliament proposed to add a new article 3a to the Treaty 
specifying that the Community "shall act only to fulfill the tasks conferred 
on it by the treaties and to achieve the objectives defined thereby. Where 
powers have not been exclusively or completely assigned to the Community, it 
shall, in carrying out its tasks, take action wherever the achievement of the 
objectives requires it because, by virtue of their magnitude or effects, they 
transcend the frontiers of the Member States or because they can be undertaken 
more efficiently by the Community than by the Member States acting separately" 
{Martin Ill, Article 3a). 
The assizes took over this definition in Parliament virtually without change, 
but took the view that it should be enshrined in the preamble to the treaties 
{Rome Declaration, paras. 23 & 24) 
The Maastricht Treaty includes a new article 3b which reads: 
'The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by 
this Treaty and of the objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do 
not fall within its exclusive jurisdiction, the Community shall take action, 
in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the 
objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
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Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of proposed 
action, be better achieved by the Community. 
Any action by the Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve 
the objectives of this Treaty'. 
VI. Strengthening Community Competences: a) social 
The European Parliament requested a substantial extension of Community 
competences and powers in the social field, in particular to provide for the 
adoption, with majority voting in Council, of policies concerning employment, 
labour law and working conditions, vocational training, social security, 
health and safety at work, the right of association and collective bargaining, 
as well as for the establishment of a legal framework conducive to negotiations 
of collective conventions at Community level (Martin II, paras. 13, 14 & 15). 
The assizes stated that the treaties "must provide for a common social policy" 
and "this requires not only strong assertion of the objectives in the treaties 
but also decision-taking in these areas by qualified majority". It also called 
for a European system of concerted action involving management and labour (Rome 
Declaration, para. 5). 
The Maastricht Treaty contains no modifications to the social chapter of the 
treaty as this was not accepted by one Member State - the UK. However, 
protocol no.14 in Annex 1 of the new Treaty allows the other eleven Member 
States to use the Community framework to adopt a series of measures that would 
not a pp 1 y to the UK, and the UK would not vote within Council ( 44 votes 
instead of 54 necessary for a qualified majority). Under this protocol, the 
eleven would be able to adopt measures by a qualified majority concerning 
working conditions, information and consultation of workers, equal 
opportunities and equal treatment and integraton of persons excluded from the 
labour market. The eleven could also adopt, unanimously, measures concerning 
social security, redundancy, workers representation and eo-determination, 
employment of third country nationals and financial aid for employment and job 
creation. Provisions for management and labour to negotiate and agree at 
European level, with the possibility to follow up such agreements with 
legislation, is included. The EEC Treaty has been amended to provide for a 
vocational training policy (new chapter on education and vocational training). 
VI. Strengthening Community Competences b) environment policy 
Parliament considered that Community competences regarding environment policy 
were adequate (except as regards Community participation in international 
action and the absence of an environment fund) but that a switch from 
unanimity to majority voting was the key reform needed in this area. It also 
ea 11 ed for Article 2 of the Treaty to be amended to support the go a 1 of 
sustainable development (MARTIN II, para. 15 & MARTIN Ill, Articles 2 & 130r). 
The assizes asked for the EC to be given "additional competences in the field 
of the environment and that decision-taking in this area should be by qualifed 
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majority voting". It called for Article 2 of the Treaty to be amended to 
support the goal of sustainable development (Rome Declaration, para. 9). 
The Maastricht Treaty amended Article 2 to refer to sustainable growth and 
amended Article 130s to provide for qualified majority voting on environment 
policy, except for fiscal measures, land use planning, management of water 
resources and choice of energy supply. It also provided for the establishment 
of a "cohesion fund" devoted largely to environmental matters. 
VI. Strengthening Community Competences: c) economic & social cohesion 
The European Parliament requested a strengthening of policies for economic 
convergence and actions for economic and social cohesion in particular to "aim 
at overcoming the disparities between the various regions" (Article 130A in 
MARTIN II I). 
The assizes called for the treaties to "include adequate provisions for 
economic and social cohesion" (Rome Declaration, para. 5) and for regional 
policy to "aim gradually to eliminate the disparities between the regions and 
considers that the resources at the disposal of the Community, notably the 
structural funds, must be reinforced. 
The Maastricht Treaty listed the strengthening of economic and social cohesion 
as one of the objectives of the European Union (Article B of common 
provisions) and of the Community (Article 2). The chapter of the Treaty on 
economic and social cohesion was revised, strengthening its references to the 
need for cohesion, and providing for the establishment of a new cohesion fund 
providing financial contributions to projects in the fields of the environment 
and trans-European networks in less prosperous Member States. This fund shall 
be established by the end of 1993. The IGC also adopted protocol No.15 in 
Annex I of the Maastricht Treaty. This protocol looks toward the review of the 
structural funds and of the Community's system of own resources due to take 
place during 1992 and states the intention of the Member States "to take 
greater account of the contributive capacity of individual Member States in the 
system of own resources and to examine the means of correcting for the 1 ess 
prosperous Member States degressive elements existing in the present own 
resources system". It states "their wi 11 i ngness to modulate the 1 evel s of 
Community participation in the context of programmes of the structural funds" 
and to review the size of the structural funds. 
VI. Strengthening Community Competences: d) other areas 
The European Parliament called for provisions to be added to the Treaty g1v1ng 
the Community strengthened competences in the fields of transport (in 
particular to add safety provisions and trans-nat i onal infrastructures to the 
existing competences), consumer protection, culture ("to protect and promote 
the cultural wealth and diversity of the European Community"), womens' rights, 
and development cooperation (Martin II & Ill). 
DOC_EN\RR\205517 - 18 - PE 155.444/fin./Part I 
·The assizes called for a separate article on cultural policy to be inserted 
into the Treaty (para. 11), and for "the Community to pursue active policies" 
in the fields of social and civil rights, education, etc (Rome Declaration, 
para. 6). 
The Maastricht Treaty added new titles and chapters to the EEC Treaty 
concerning trans-European networks for transport and telecommunications, 
consumer protection, culture, education and vocational training, public 
health, industrial policy and development cooperation. However, despite 
development being added to the EC Treaty, the financing of the Lome convention 
remains intergovernmental. New articles were added to existing chapters (eg. 
safety added to the transport chapter). 
VII. Judicial System & Application of Community Law 
The European Parliament called for the Court of Justice to be given powers "to 
impose sanctions, including financial sanctions on Member States which fail to 
apply Community legislation or implement Court judgments" (MARTIN 11, para. 
29) . Parliament a 1 so requested the right to go to the Court of Justice for 
annulment (MARTIN II, para. 38). 
The assizes took the view "that it is essential for the decisions taken by the 
Community to be implemented both by the Member States and the Community and 
calls on the Member States to take whatever legislative and executive action it 
required to ensure that Community legislation is transposed into domestic law 
on schedule" (Rome Declaration, para. 15). 
The Maastricht Treaty added a new paragraph to Article 171 allowing the Court 
of Justice to impose "a lump sum or penalty payment" on Member States that 
have not complied with its judgments. It adds to Article 173 a new sentence 
allowing the European Parliament (and the Central Bank) to bring cases for 
annulment, but only "for the purpose of protecting their prerogatives" and 
provides for Parliament itself to be taken to the Court (this entrenches 
current case law). However, the Court will not be competent to review 
decisions taken pursuant to the foreign policy or internal cooperation 
"pillars" of the Union Treaty. 
VIII. Qualified Majority Voting in the Council 
The European Parliament considered "that unanimity should no longer be 
required for decision-taking in Council, except for constitutional matters 
(revision of the treaties), accession of new Member States and extension of 
the field of Community responsibilities (Article 235)" (MARTIN II, para. 20). 
The assizes considered that "the Council must be able to take its decisions by 
simple or qualified majority according to the circumstances; unanimity will 
only be required in the limited cases provided for by the treaties" (Rome 
Declaration, para. 12). 
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The Maastricht Treaty extended qualified majority voting to some aspects of 
environment policy, development policy, consumer protection, educational 
measures, public health, trans-European networks and some minor matters. It 
will extend as of January 1996 to the determination of which third country 
nationals require visas. No change was made in the social field, except as 
applies among the 11 Member States to a limited number of areas. In some 
areas, (foreign policy, cooperation in justice and home affairs, other areas 
of environment policy) Council will be able to agree unanimously to use 
qualified majority voting for certain matters. 
IX. Appointment of the Commission 
The European Parliament called for "Parliament to be given the right to elect 
the President of the Commission on a proposal from the European Council : the 
President should, with the agreement of Council, choose the members of the 
Commission;" and Parliament should then have a "vote of confidence" in the new 
Commission as a whole before it takes office (MARTIN II, para. 35). This 
procedure should be followed in the months fo 11 owing each European 
parliamentary election with the Commission's term of office therefore being 
changed to five years to follow that of Parliament (MARTIN III, Article 158). 
The assizes took the view "that the President of the Commission must be 
elected by the European Parliament on a proposal from the European Council by 
an absolute majority; that the President of the Commission, in agreement with 
the Council, should appoint the members of the Commission and that the 
incoming Commission as a whole should present itself and its programme to the 
European Parliament for a vote of confidence; believes that the Commission's 
term of office should start at the same time as that of the European 
Parliament; the same procedure should be followed if a new Commission has to 
be appointed during the parliamentary terms;" (Rome Declaration, para. 18). 
The Maastri cht Treaty provides for the Member States to consult the European 
Parliament on the person they intend to appoint as President of the 
Commission, to consult the nominee for President on the other persons whom 
they intend to appoint as members of the Commission and for the "President and 
the other members of the Commission thus nominated" to "be subject as a body to 
a vote of approval by the European Parliament" (Article 158). As of January 
1995 the term of office of the Commission shall be five years, thus enabling a 
new Commission to be appointed in the months following each European 
parliamentary election, as requested by Parliament. 
X. eo-decision Powers for the European Parliament on Community legislation 
The European Parliament had asked for Council and Parliament to be given 
"equal rights and equal weight in the legislative process" with two readings 
in each body, a conciliation procedure to reconcile differences, and the 
approval of both bodies necessary to adopt Community legislation (Martin II, 
para. 33). 
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The assizes considered that "Parliament must play an equal part with the 
Council in the legislative and budgetary functions of the Union" (Rome 
Declaration, para. 12) and that "as regards the European Community's 
1 egi slat i ve powers, co-deci si on arrangements between the European Parliament 
and the Council must be devised" (para. 19). 
The Maastricht Treaty introduces a new procedure in Article 189b which 
provides for two readings_ each in Council and Parliament to be followed, if 
necessary, by a conciliation procedure to reconcile differences. Both 
Parliament and Counci 1 would have to approve the outcome of conci 1 i at ion. 
However, if cone i 1 i at ion fails, Council can adopt a text un i 1 at era 11 y wh i eh 
will become law unless it is rejected within six weeks by the European 
Parliament acting by a majority of its members. This eo-decision procedure, 
weighted in favour of Council, would apply to some fifteen articles under the 
EEC Treaty (see annex on proposed Maastri cht procedures). The Treaty also 
extends the parliamentary assent procedure to six new areas and introduces the 
old cooperation procedure (two readings but final say in Council if it is 
unanimous) to some fifteen new areas and maintains it in three. Finally, the 
procedure for consulting Parliament is introduced in some twenty-four new 
areas. 
XI. Right to Initiate Legislation 
The European Parliament called "for Parliament also to be given the right to 
initiate legislative proposals in cases where the Commission fails to respond 
within a specified deadline to a specific request adopted by the majority of 
members of Parliament to introduce proposals" (Martin II, para. 34). 
The assizes took the view that "a right of initiative must be established in 
the event of the Commission failing to act" (Rome Declaration, para. 19). 
The Maastricht Treaty introduced a 
Parliament may, acting by the majority 
to submit any appropriate proposa 1 on 
Community act is required for the 
(Article 138b). 
new provision whereby "the European 
of its members, request the Commission 
matters on which it considers that a 
purpose of implementing this treaty" 
XII. Right to Establish Committees of Inquiry 
The European Parliament asked for "a right, enshrined in the treaties, to 
establish committees of inquiry to investigate alleged contraventions of 
Community law or instances of maladministration with respect to Community 
responsibilities" (MARTIN II Resolution, para. 40). 
The assizes believed "that the European Parliament's supervisory powers must 
be enhanced and formally enshrined in the treaties" (Rome Declaration, para. 
20). 
The Maastricht Treaty provides that Parliament may "set up a temporary 
committee of inquiry to investigate, without prejudice to the powers conferred 
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by the treaty on other institutions or bodies, alleged contraventions or 
maladministration in the implementation of Community law, except where the 
alleged facts are being examined before a court and while the case is still 
subject to legal proceedings". It provided for detailed provisions governing 
the exercise of this right to be determined by common agreement among 
Parliament, Council and the Commission. 
XIII. Powers of Budgetary Control 
The European Parliament called for greater information rights, for its powers 
of budgetary control to be enhanced and in particular called for "the principle 
that the observations made in the discharge decisions are binding on all the 
institutions to be enshrined in the treaty and for the discharge authorities' 
right to ask the Court of Auditors to carry out investigations and submit 
reports to be enshrined in the treaty" (Maastricht II Resolution, para. 37). 
The assizes called for Parliament's supervisory powers to be enhanced and the 
position of the Court of Auditors to be strengthened (Rome Declaration, para. 
20). 
The Maastricht Treaty specifies that "the Commission shall submit any 
necessary information to the European Parliament at the latter's request" and 
that "the Commission sha 11 take a 11 appropriate steps to act on the 
observations in decisions giving discharge and on other observations by the 
European Parliament relating to the execution of expenditure" and that "at the 
request of the European Parliament or the Council, the Commission shall report 
on the measures taken in 1 i ght of these observations and comments, and in 
particular on the instructions given to the departments which are responsible" 
(Article 206). It is also specified that the Court of Auditors may issue 
special reports on specific questions at the request of other institutions 
(Article 188b). The Court of Auditors is elevated to the rank of a Community 
institution (Article 4). 
XIV. Budgetary Procedures 
The European Parliament asked for the reaffirmation of the principle of 
budgetary universality (i.e. the inclusion in the budget of the Lome 
expenditures, and the capital account operations), the right of assent for the 
own resources, the abolition of the division between the obligatory and non-
obligatory expenditures. It proposed to lay down in the Treaty the principle 
and general rules for a system of multiannual financial planning and a reform 
of the budget procedure (MARTIN Ill). 
The assizes took the view "that the Community must finance its policy 
activities from its Own Resources; considers that the decision concerning the 
Community's own resources should be taken in agreement with the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments and that the financial provisions 
contained in the Treaties must be thoroughly revised in order to ensure a more 
even balance between the two branches of the budgetary authority;" (Rome 
Declaration, para. 3). 
DOC_EN\RR\205517 - 22 - PE 155.444/fin./Part I 
The Maastricht Treaty amended article 199 to ensure that administrative 
expenditures relating to common foreign and security policy and to cooperation 
in the spheres of justice and home affairs shall be charged to the budget 
though this introduces a possible area of ten si on between intergovernmental 
decisions by Council on CFSP and justice and home affairs with implications to 
the EC budget and Parliament's budgetary powers. 
The Maastricht Treaty gives the European Parliament the right of consultation 
for the own resources and does not contain any of the other proposals made by 
Parliament in this field, though some of them will be dealt with in the 
forthcoming revision of the Community's finances ("DELORS II") 
XV. Role of National Parliaments 
The European Parliament expressed "its readiness to assist the parliaments of 
the Member States with access to information" and to "cooperate with the 
parliaments of the Member States in the now regular meetings that take place 
at various levels". However, it considered "that it would not be useful to 
set up a new i nst i tut ion" or congress of members of nation a 1 parliaments 
alongside the European Parliament (Martin II, para. 23). 
The assizes supported "enhanced cooperation between the nation a 1 parliaments 
and the European Parliament, through regular meetings of specialized 
committees, exchanges of information and by organ1s1ng conferences of 
parliaments of the EC when the discussion of guidelines of vital importance to 
the Community justifies it, in particular when IGCs are being held" (Rome 
Declaration, para. 13). 
The Maastricht Treaty does not set up any new permanent institution but has 
two declarations contained in Annex 2 to the Union Treaty. In declaration 
no.l2, the national governments undertake to ensure "that national parliaments 
receive Commission proposals for legislation in good time for information or 
possible examination" and took the view that it is important "for contacts 
between the national parliaments and the European Parliament to be stepped up, 
in particular in the granting of appropriate reciprocal !facilities and 
regular meetings between members of Parliament interested in the same issues". 
In declaration no.l3, the European Parliament and the national parliaments "are 
invited to meet as necessary as a conference of the parliaments (or 
"assizes"}". This will be "without prejudice to the powers of the European 
Parliament and the rights of the national parliaments". 
XVI. Regions 
The European Parliament called for the creation of "a body consisting of 
representatives of the regional authorities in the Member States whose 
function would be comparable to that of the Economic and Social Committee in 
its specific field" (Martin II, para. 22}. 
The assizes did not mention this subject. 
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The Maastri cht Treaty established a "Committee of the Regions" with advisory 
status. It is to have the same number of members as the Economic and Social 
Committee with which it will share a common secretariat. It will be consulted 
on matters affecting the regions and may also give an opinion if it wishes, 
wherever the Economic and Social Committee is consulted (Articles 198a, b & c). 
XVII. Economic & Social Committee 
The European Parliament proposed moderately to strengthen the autonomy of the 
Economic and Social Committee by giving it the right to adopt its own rules of 
procedure, subject to Council's approval by a qualified majority (instead of 
unanimity as now) and to be able to deliver opinions on its own initiative 
(Martin Ill, Article 196 & 198). 
The assizes did not deal with this subject. 
The Maastricht Treaty allows the Economic & Social Committee to adopt its own 
rules of procedure without reference to Council, to meet on its own 
initiative, and to issue opinions on its own initiative. It also raised the 
minimum time limit for its opinion from 10 days to 1 month (Articles 196 & 
198). 
0 
0 0 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE STRATEGY 
We are back to the old question of whether a glass is half-full or half-
empty. But when you are thirsty you do not spend too much time discussing 
that point: you drink what there is and you then go looking for more. 
So it must be for the Parliament. It must make the most of the changes 
brought about by Maastri cht and it must start to prepare for the next IGC 
which is already envisaged for 1996. If possible it should bring forward this 
date, for instance by taking advantage of opportunities such as the 
enlargement of the Community which inevitably raises institutional questions. 
In the course of 1992 the Community wi 11 have to deal with some issues 1 eft 
open at Maastricht, notably: 
the review of the number of members of the European Parliament and of the 
Commission. It is worth noting that the former requires treaty amendment 
(or adaptation in the context of adopting a uniform electoral system); 
financial and budgetary matters left over to the "DELORS 11" package: this 
will be one of the most important issues facing Parliament this year. 
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Parliament wi 11 a 1 so have to take full advantage of the prov1 s 1 ons of the 
Maastricht Treaty. This must be done in a number of ways. The following 
immediately spring to mind: 
* Maximising the eo-decision procedure (Article 189b) by ensuring that 
Council never makes use of its right to act unilaterally in the absence of 
agreement with Parliament. Parliament must make it cl ear that it would 
always reject any act adopted by Council in this way. We should seek an 
undertaking from the Commission to withdraw proposals in such 
circumstances. We should ask national parliaments, when ratifying the new 
Treaty, to instruct their governments not to use this option. 
* Maximising the impact of the procedure for appointing the Commission, for 
instance by making the vote on the President as solemn as possible and 
organising hearing within individual candidate-members of the Commission. 
* Seeking to overcome the "pillar" structure of the Treaty by encouraging 
the Commission to develop its role in foreign policy and judicial matters. 
* Making full use of all the other procedures involving Parliament. 
Clearly, the rules of procedure of Parliament will have to be modified in this 
light in time for the entry into force of the new Treaty. 
Above all, however, Parliament must prepare the ground for the next treaty 
revision. The Maastricht Treaty itself provides for a new IGC in 1996 in 
order to review the provisions concerning the scope of the eo-decision 
procedure, foreign policy and security, defence, the classification and 
hierarchy of Community acts and the "pillar" structure of the Treaty. Other 
issues will no doubt be dealt with as well. Parliament must prepare its own 
detailed proposals beforehand, either in the form of treaty amendments and/or 
in the form of a draft constitution. (For those who consider that the 
treaties are, in effect, the constitution of the Community, the distinction 
between these two approaches is not enormous). 
Parliament must also explore the possibility of reopening at least some issues 
before 1996. One opportunity to do this is in the context of enlargement. 
Parliament is on record as stating that it will only give its assent to 
enlargement if the institutions are capable of handling it (HERMAN resolution 
of 1989). Clearly a Community or Union of 16 or more member states can only 
function with stronger i nst it uti ons, not least as regards majority voting in 
Council: unanimity allows individual states to hold the Community hostage. 
Maastricht was a step forward, albeit it an insufficient one, on the road to a 
European Union of federal type. Parliament's task now it to make sure that 
the next step is one of substance and comes quickly. 
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